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Topic 1: Address

The Twilight of Employment at Will?
An Update
THEODOREJ. ST. ANTOINE*

INTRODUCTION
A 55-year-old white male, who has spent thirty years working his
way up to a responsible middle-management position in his company, is
asked for his resignation. No reason given. Even though the employee
could demonstrate that he still is qualified to perform his duties, the employer's action in dismissing him would be quite unexceptionable under
the conventional American common law doctrine of employment at will. 1
The situation could be even more disturbing. If the employment-at-will
principle were allowed its full scope, an employee would have no recourse even if he knew he was being discharged because he had refused to
commit perjury at the behest of his employer, or had refused to participate in an illegal price-fixing scheme, or had taken time from work to fulfill his civic duty of serving on a jury.
One would like to assume that these latter, more extreme cases are
relatively rare. But the practical problem of the employee who is dismissed unfairly, with all the shattering economic and psychological consequences that may follow, is a sizeable one. One careful scholar has esti*Mr. St. Antoine is a James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law, University of
Michigan. A.B., Fordham College; J.D., University of Michigan.
1
Today a broad range of federal and state statutory protections apply to certain classes
of employees. For example, the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976),
prohibits discharges because of union or other concerted activity; Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U .S.C. § 2000e (1976), prohibits discharges because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. § 621 (1976, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. III 1979), prohibits discharges because of age
from 40 to 70.
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mated that about one million nonunion, nonprobationary employees are
discharged annually in this country, and that of this number as many as
100,000 would have viable causes of action if they were afforded the
same ''just cause'' protections available under the usual collective bargaining agreement. 2
Probably the most significant development in the whole field of labor
law during the past decade has been the growing willingness of the courts
to modify the common law at-will employment doctrine. The rest of this
paper will briefly examine the sources of that doctrine, sketch out the
main lines of recent qualifications and exceptions to it, and speculate a bit
about possible future, directions.
COMMON LAW OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS

It is an oft-told tale that the rule making employment arrangements of
indefinite duration contracts at will, terminable by either party at any time
for any reason, is not a rule which has roots deep in the English common
law, 3 but one which sprang full-blown in 1877 from the busy and perhaps
careless pen of American treatise writer Horace G. Wood. 4 Wood has
been strongly criticized for relying on dubious precedent, with no square
holdings supporting him. 5 Nonetheless, his pronouncement was admirably suited to the Zeitgeist of an emerging industrial nation. Before the
nineteenth century was out, our courts could confidently assert: ''All
[employers] may dismiss their employees at will, be they many or few,
for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.' ' 6
Professor Wood has had his defenders as well as his detractors. It has
been pointed out, for example, that he was anticipated by California's
adoption of an at-will principle in the Field Code in 1872/ and by such
2
Stieber, The Case for Protection of Unorganized Employees Against Unjust Discharge, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASS'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTYSECOND ANNUAL MEETING 155, 160-61 (B. Dennis ed. 1980); THE EMPLOYMENT-ATWILLISSUE-A BNA SPECIAL REPORT 24 (Nov. 22, 1982).
3Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute 62
VA. L. REV. 481, 485 (1976); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 425-25 (R. Bell ed. 1771) (general hiring of menial labor for an unfixed term
presumed to be for a year).
4H. WOOD, LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 272-73 (1877).
5
See, e.g., Note, Implied Contract Right to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335,
340-45 (1974).
6Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884). See also Martin v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117,42 N.E. 416 (1895).
7
This provision now appears in slightly modified form in CAL. LABOR CoDE § 2922
(1971 & Supp. 1984).
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decisions as Hathaway v. Bennett in New York8 and Perry v. Wheeler in
Kentucky. 9 Furthermore, the traditional English rule presuming a hiring
period of one year was apparently grounded in the medieval Statutes of
Labourers, which were initially designed as pro-employer measures to
prevent unauthorized quitting or wage-gouging by employees during the
periods of severe labor shortages resulting from the Black Death. 10 By the
mid-nineteenth century, English courts also held that, absent an express
contractual provision, either party could terminate an employment relationship upon "reasonable notice" in accordance with the "custom of the
trade. " 11
The theoretical underpinning of employment at will consists of such
concepts as freedom of contract, lack of assent, and most specifically inadequacy of consideration and absence of conventional mutuality of obligation. It would, of course, be contrary to the Thirteenth Amendment to
compel an individual employee to work against his will. Contemporary
contract analysis has become increasingly skeptical, however, about the
soundness of such doctrines as consideration and mutuality of obligation,
thus clearing the way for major judicial surgery, especially in the more
egregious cases.
Three quite different groups of employees have managed to escape
the harsh strictures of employment at will. The first consists of the minuscule handful of persons whose knowledge or talents are so unusual and
valuable-the rock star, the professional quarterback, the corporate
executive-that they have the leverage to negotiate a contract for a fixed
term with their employer. Second, over half of the approximately fifteen
million employees of federal, state, and local governments are protected
by tenure arrangements or other civil service procedural devices. 12 In addition, all public employees have certain minimum constitutional rights to
free speech, due process, and so on. 13 The third category, of course, is
composed of the workers covered by collective bargaining agreements,
80% of which expressly prohibit discharge or discipline except for

8

Hathaway v. Bennett, 10 N.Y. 108 (1854).
Perry v. Wheeler, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 541 (1877).
10
See, e.g., C. BAKALY & J. GROSSMAN, MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
2 (1983); 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 459-60 (2d ed. 1923).
11
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Labor and Employment Law, At-Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal, 36 THE RECORD
170, 175 (1981).
12
Peck, Unjust Discharge from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40
OHIO ST. L. J. 1, 8-9 (1979).
13
See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 u.s. 593 (1973).
9
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"cause" or "just cause. " 14 Union membership in the United States,
however, has now declined to only about 20% of the total labor force. 15
We may thus assume that something like 70 to 75% of our 100-millionplus work force operates under contracts at will. The gravity of the problem of subjecting so large a group to arbitrary treatment by management,
however one might resolve the problem, needs no further elaboration.

RECENT JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
Overview

Different commentators will understandably differ in their analysis
and classification of the burgeoning mass of judicial decisions on employment at will. By my own reckoning, jurisdictions modifying the atwill doctrine in one way or another through holdings or strong dicta now
number about twenty: California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Oregon, and West Virginia. Less definite expressions of a
willingness to revise the doctrine in appropriate circumstances are found
in a half dozen additional states: Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska, and Wisconsin. Several states have accepted or said they would
accept modifications in certain situations while rejecting them in others:
Alabama, Indiana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. On the
other hand, about nine states have recently reaffirmed the at-will principle: Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, South
Carolina, Texas, and Vermont.
In assessing the courts' attitudes in these early trail-blazing decisions,
I am satisfied that most attention should be focused on the particular fact
situations involved, and caution exercised about swallowing whole the
abstract language of the opinions. Whether in recognizing or refusing to
recognize an exception to the traditional doctrine, the courts have often
spoken in much too sweeping terms. For example, I doubt whether any
court would now decline to sustain at least a nominal cause of action if a
discharge flagrantly violated a fundamental, legislatively declared public
policy. On the other hand, despite some very broad language in opinions
from such jurisdictions as California and Massachusetts, I do not believe
14

Peck, supra note 12, at 8.
U.S. BUR. LAB. STAT., HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS-1978, BULL. No. 2000
at 507 (1979); New York Times, May 31, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
15
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there is a square holding by any court that an employer may not fire an
employee without a showing of just cause, except where there is a contractual provision to that effect.
Both tort and contract theories have been used by the courts, singly or
in combination, to ease the grip of the at-will employment doctrine. Tort
concepts are peculiarly well suited to the truly outrageous situation,
where the conscience of the court is shocked and yet it would be hard to
find that the employer had committed itself contractually to the employee
in any way. On the other hand, a less venturesome court is likely to find
contract theory more congenial. If it can be said that the employer has
limited its own freedom of action, expressly or impliedly, then it is not
the court that is imposing a new duty; rights are simply being enforced in
accordance with the parties' voluntary undertaking.
There are important practical differences, depending upon whether a
particular action is characterized as tort or contract. For example, the statute of limitations for a tort action is usually shorter than for a contract action. Perhaps most important, tort opens the way for compensatory and
punitive damages, damages for mental distress, and the like, none of
which are ordinarily an element of recovery in contract.
Tort Theories

Discharges Contrary to ''Public Policy''
Probably the most appealing case for recognizing the tort of wrongful
discharge is where the employer has violated some fundamental public
policy, especially one that has been clearly enunciated by the legislature.
Some courts would apparently make that second condition, namely, a
legislative (or constitutional) declaration of policy, an essential element.16 Cases invoking the public policy exception fall naturally into
three categories: where the employee was discharged for refusing to engage in unlawful activity, where the employee was discharged for performing a public duty, and where the employee was discharged for exercising a legal right or privilege.
16see, e.g., Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3559,3561

(Ky. 1983); Suchodolski v. Michigan Canso!. Gas Co.,412 Mich. 692,316 N.W. 2d 710
(1982); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615, 432 A.2d 464 (1981). Other
courts, if taken at their word, have flatly declined to recognize public policy exceptions to
the at-will doctrine, regarding it as a matter for the legislature. E.g., Molder v. Southwestern Bell Co., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2409 (Tex. Civ. App. Dec. 29, 1983); Murphy
v. American Home Prod. Corp., 58 N.Y. 2d 293, 448 N.E. 2d 86 58 N.Y.S. 2d 293
(1983); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981); Goodroe v.
Georgia Power Co., 148 Ga. App. 193, 251 S.E. 2d 51 (1978).
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Refusal to Commit Crime. Petermann v. Teamsters Local 39617
was the case that broke through the once-solid barriers of employment at
will. A labor union fired one of its employees because he refused to perjure himself on behalf of the union before a state legislative committee.
The California Court of Appeals recognized a cause of action, concluding
that public policy would be seriously undermined if an employee could be
dismissed for a refusal to commit the crime of perjury. Similarly, in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 18 the Supreme Court of California sustained a cause of action when an employer discharged an employee for refusing to participate in an illegal price-fixing scheme. Although a court
might be troubled in certain borderline situations, for example, when the
employer did not realize it was demanding an illegal act of its employee,
it is difficult to see how any court today could be so constrained by hidebound notions of employment at will that it would not uphold a cause of
action when an employee is dismissed for a refusal to participate in a
clearcut instance of unlawful conduct.
Public Duties and "Whistleblowing." In a celebrated case, Nees v.
Hocks, 19 a wrongful discharge action was sustained when an employee
was fired for taking time from work to serve on a jury. The most common
examples of discharges for performing a public service involve so-called
''whistleblowing. '' An employee is fired because he reports to the civil
authorities, or even to superiors in his own company, concerning the
wrongdoing of his employer or his co-workers. The easiest case for allowing suit is where the employee is also being importuned to break the
law himself. 20 There are, however, substantial variations in these cases.
The employee may have responded to an official subpoena, or he may
have seized the initiative in speaking out. His suspicions may or may not
be well-founded. He may in all good faith cause substantial damage to the
reputation of an innocent party. As. might be expected, the courts have re17

Petermann v. TeamstersLocal396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
But cf. Brockmeyer v. Dunn & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983) (alleged wrongful discharge is contract action, not tort; no violation of public policy merely
because employee was discharged in part for a statement that he would testify truthfully if
called as witness in sex discrimination case).
18
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839 (1980) (contract and tort action upheld). See also Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72,417 A.2d 505 (1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179
Conn. 471,427 A.2d 385 (1980); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co., 81
Mich. App. 489,265 N.W. 2d 385 (1978).
19
Nees v. Hocks, 272 Ore. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). See also Reuther v. Fowler &
Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978).
2
~ameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839 (1980).
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sponded differently to these differing situations, upholding some actions
and denying others. 21

Legal Rights and Privileges. The most frequent situation in which
employees have been discharged for exercising legal rights involves the
filing of workers' compensation claims in states where the statute does
not contain an express prohibition of employer retaliation. Several jurisdictions have recognized a cause of action in these circumstances, reasoning that it would frustrate the public policy behind workers' compensation
if employees could assert their statutory rights only at the risk of losing
their jobs. 22 Some courts have gone the other way, arguing that if the legislature wished to protect employees filing workers' compensation claims
against employer retaliation, such a provision could easily have been included in the statute. 23
Potentially the most expansive recent decision in this area is Novosel
v. Nationwide Insurance Co. 24 The Third Circuit, purportedly applying
Pennsylvania law, found actionable an employee's discharge for refusing
to join his employer, an insurance company, in lobbying in favor of nofault legislation and for privately opposing the company's position. The
court concluded that "a cognizable expression of public policy" could be
derived from the free speech provisions of either the Federal or State
Constitution. 25 It is well established, of course, that the Federal Constitution's guarantees of free speech, due process, and equal protection under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments operate directly only against state
action and not against that of private parties. 26 Decisions under the various state constitutions are more mixed, however, and it has been argued
21
Causes of action were recognized in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85
Ill. 2d 124,421 N.E. 2d 876 (1981), and Harless v. First Nat. Bank, 246 S.E. 2d 270 (W.
Va. 1978), but rejected in Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174
(1974); Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E. 2d 1054 (Ind. App. 1980); Hands v. National Living Centers, Inc, 633 S.W. 2d 674 (Tex. App. 1982); Murphy v. American
Home Prod. Corp., 58 N.Y. 2d 293,448 N.E. 2d 86, 58 N.Y.S. 2d 293 (1983). Some of
the seemingly contrary decisions are distinguishable on their facts.
22E.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E. 2d 425 (1973);
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E. 2d 353 (1978); Firestone Textile Co.
v. Meadows, 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3559 (Ky. 1983); Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284
Ore. 597, 588 P.2d (1087) (1978).
23
E.g., Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978); Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp.,
364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. App. 1978); Green v. Amerada Hess Corp., 612 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 356 (1980). Cf. Meredith v. C.E. Walther, Inc., 422 So.
2d 761 (Ala. 1982) (lawsuit against employer for claimed employee trust assets).
24
Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. I 983).
25
/d. at 899.
26 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163
(1972); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
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that the free speech protections of state constitutions should properly be
regarded as prohibiting the discharge of private employees for the expression of political views. 27 If substantive free speech constitutional provisions are to be considered expressions of public policy binding on private
employers, the next step will be to maintain that procedural due process
constitutional provisions are likewise binding.
Other dismissals declared actionable because an employee had been
exercising a legal right or privilege included a discharge for refusing to
take a lie detector test in a jurisdiction prohibiting its forcible administration,28 and the discharge of a store manager for taking a statutorily guaranteed ''day of rest'' during which his store was burglarized. 29
Where the "public policy" sought to be protected is the right to engage in union activity, courts have held under the federal preemption doctrine that the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction. 30 Preemption problems
beyond the purview of this article could be presented if the Labor Board
and the courts do not continue to insist upon a "concerted" element in
employee conduct as a prerequisite to its being protected under section 7
of the National Labor Relations Act. 31 Otherwise, the discharge of a single protesting employee, now frequently actionable under the new public
policy exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine, might remain
within the exclusive domain of the NLRB. 32

"Abusive" or "Retaliatory" Discharges
Some courts have gone beyond the more standard ''public policy''
exceptions and have recognized a cause of action when an employer has
sought to exploit his position for personal advantage. The prototype of
this kind of case is Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 33 where a female worker
was fired for refusing to date her foreman. Other courts have declined to
27See Note, Free Speech, the Private Employee, and State Constitutions, 91 YALE L.
J. 522 (1982).
28
Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying
Penns~lvania law).
2
Cloutier v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981).
30
Viestenz v. Fleming Cos., 681 F.2d 699 (lOth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct.
303 (1982); Morris v. Chem-Lawn Corp., 541 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
31
See, e.g., Meyers Industries, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (Jan. 6, 1984), overruling
Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975); (f. NLRB v. City Disposal Systems,
Inc., 104 S.Ct. 1505 (1984).
32
The Supreme Court has generally been quite liberal, however, in allowing state
regulation in the areas of employment discrimination, Colorado Anti-Discrimination
Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, 372 U.S. 714 (1963), unemployment compensation,
New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979), and similar
welfare concerns, see, e.g., Teamsters Loca124 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283,297 (1959).
33
Mongev. BeebeRubberCo., 114N.H. 130, 316A.2d549(1974).
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remedy such personal abuse or similar retaliatory conduct. 34 These latter
courts apparently believe that the public policy exception should not be
stretched to cover what are essentially disputes between individuals. On
the other hand, some commentators have contended that all unjust dismissals undercut the community's interests in fairness and productivity in
the workplace, and therefore should be actionable as matters of public
policy. 35
Contract Theories

In the last few years the courts have turned increasingly to contract
theory in fashioning wrongful discharge actions. As indicated earlier,
more conservative courts are likely to find comfort in the notion that they
are not forging new law for the parties, but are merely enforcing the parties' own promises. On the other hand, the logic of contract theory also
means that an employer may generally eliminate an employee's cause of
action for wrongful discharge by an express disclaimer of any right to employment. 36 Furthermore, the grounds for establishing many contractual
claims are often likely to be restricted by their very nature to middle management and higher personnel. Contract remedies will also be much more
limited, since ordinarily they will not include compensatory or punitive
damages. 37
Express or Implied Guarantees
In the early 1980s a number of courts concluded that an employer's
statement of policy as set forth in personnel manuals or employee handbooks, or an employer's oral assurances to employees at the time of hir34
E.g., Fawcett v. G.C. Murphy & Co., 46 Ohio St. 2d 245, 348 N.E. 2d 144
(1976); Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507,509, 573 P.2d 907,909 (Ariz. App.
1977); Catania v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 381 So.2d 265 (Fla. App. 1980); Givens v.
Hixson, 275 Ark. 370,631 S.W.2d 263 (1982).
35 Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1948 (1983).
36E.g., Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980);
Craig v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
37
Contract damages for wrongful discharge have not been negligible. See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E. 2d 1251 (1977) (lost commissions of $46,000); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579,292 N.W.
2d 880 (1980) ("legitimate expectations" of $73,000 and $300,000, including unexercised stock options for two plaintiffs). But cf. Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College,
636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981) (back pay only for period during which employee was denied
"contractual due process" in dismissal); Pepsi Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc. v. Woods, 440
N.E.2d 696 (Ind. App. 1982) (nominal damages only for justifiable reliance in leaving
prior job).
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ing, could be found to constitute, either separately or in combination, an
express or implied contract that the employee would not be discharged
except for "just cause." The leading decisions included Pugh v. See's
Candies, Inc., 38 in California, Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Michigan, 39 in Michigan, and Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, lnc., 40 in New
York. In the past, employer statements that an employee would not be
terminated except for good cause would have been treated as simply unilateral declarations of present intent, of no legal consequence. They were
like the "social promises" encountered in first-year contracts, where the
fickle swain said he would meet his date under the Biltmore clock at eight
on Saturday. Under the traditional view, even an employer's assurance of
"permanent" employment would not change the arrangement from that
of an at-will contract. 41
Probably a majority of the courts that have faced the issue during the
past decade have declined to recognize employee handbooks or other customary expressions of employer personnel policies as legally binding. 42
For these courts, apparently, such employer statements are more like
"puffing" or "social promises" than true contractual commitments,
even though the commercial employment setting plainly differs from that
of a young couple on a date. For myself, I do not find it shocking that an
38
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). Accord: Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc, lll Cal App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980);
Hodge v. Evans Fin. Corp., 707 F.2d 1566 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Shah v. American Synthetic
Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1983); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333
N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983). See also Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Ore. 96,
643 P.2d 1276 (1982) (employer may justify decision to dismiss by showing good faith);
Hernandez v. Home Ed. Livelihood Program, Inc., 98 N.M. 125, 645 P.2d !381 (N.M.
App. 1982), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 336 (1982); Adelson v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 128
Cal. ~P· 3d 891, 180 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1982) (campus practice for nontenured employee).
3
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579,292 N.W.2d 880
(1980).
40
Weinerv. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d458, 443 N.E.2d44l (1982).
41
See, e.g., Edwards v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 286 Ky. 341, 150 S.W.2d 916 (1941).
42
E.g., White v. Chelsea Indus., Inc., 425 So.2d 1090 (Ala. 1983); Heideck v. Kent
Gen. Hosp., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982); Sargent v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 78 Ill.
App. 3d 117, 397 N.E. 2d 443 (1979); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. l, 328
N.E. 2d 775 (1975); Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 551 P.2d 779 (Kan. 1976);
Mau v. Omaha Nat'! Bank, 207 Neb. 373, 299 N.W. 2d 147 (1980); Reynolds Mfg. v.
Medoza, 644 S.W. 2d 536 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982); Parker v. United Airlines, Inc., 32
Wash. App. 722, 649 P.2d 181 (1982); Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285
(8th Cir. 1982) (Arkansas law); White v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 718 F.2d 994
(llth Cir. 1983) (Georgia law); Caster v. Hennessey, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3452 (llth
Cir. 1984) (Florida law). See also Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., lOO Misc. 2d 59, 418
N.Y.S. 2d 269 (1979), affd, 74 A.D. 2d 553, 425 N.Y.S. 2d 327 (1980), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E. 2d 400 (1980). Edwards was distinguished in Weiner
v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y. 2d 458,443 N.E. 2d 441 0982).
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employer should be held to his word, when that is deliberately inscribed
in company documents or spoken in earnest by a responsible official.
This seems especially true when an employee has relied on that word by
changing jobs or declining other offers.
Companies whose current personnel manuals contain language suggesting the existence of ''just cause'' protections for employees face a serious practical question. Left unchanged, such provisions may become
the grounds for a lawsuit. On the other hand, their removal could adversely effect morale in the work force. Moreover, there is a legal question whether the unilateral elimination of such guarantees would be effective as to incumbent employees, at least as to those who could
demonstrate some specific past reliance on the old provision. If existing
"just cause" language is to be removed, it would be prudent to couple
that, quite explicitly, with the grant of some additional compensation or
other employment benefits. Regardless of these legal considerations,
however, my own feeling is that whether or not these troubling provisions
are to be excised should be decided largely as a matter of personnel policy, not law.
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
In Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 43 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts enunciated a principle which, carried to its logical
conclusion, could well eviscerate the whole at-will employment doctrine. 44 The facts in Fortune were appalling. A veteran salesman of
twenty-five years' standing had been working for some time on a five
million dollar order. Just after the sale was consummated, he was fired.
The jury was held entitled to find that the employer's reason for terminating the salesman was to deprive hiim of his full commission. In the eyes
of the court, this "bad faith" termination was a breach of the covenant of
"good faith and fair dealing" imposed by law on the parties to any
contract.
Fortune plainly suggests a substantial extension of the traditional
contract doctrine of good faith and fair dealing. Ordinarily it has not been
seen as a catch-all safeguard against arbitrary conduct on the part of the
contracting party, such as an unjust dismissal, but rather as a fairly spe43

Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N .E.2d 1251 (1977).

See also Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 386 Mass. 877,438 N.E.2d 351
(1982); Buysse v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtiss, 623 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1980)
(Minnesota law).
44
Arguing essentially that that is what should happen is Note, Protecting At Will Employment Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 92
HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980).
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cific duty imposed by law that neither party do anything which will interfere with the other's performance of its contractual obligations or which
will interfere with the right of the other to receive the benefits of the
agreement. 45 The doctrine has not been concerned with the right to terminate a contract as such. Furthermore, resort to a novel articulation of the
good faith concept was hardly necessary in Fortune. Good faith could
have been invoked without regard to the discharge itself. Or the classic
principle that full or substantial performance entitles a contracting party
to the agreed price would have served quite adequately. 46
At least one California court has come very close to saying that the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing does protect at least a long-service
employee from discharge without just cause. In Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 47 the employer had established an internal grievance procedure for resolving employee disputes, and the employee in question was
an eighteen-year veteran at the time of his discharge. The California
Court of Appeals seemed to concentrate at one point only on the latter
factor when it stated: ''Termination of employment without legal cause
after such a period of time offends the implied-in-law covenant of good
faith and fair dealing contained in all contracts including employment
contracts.' ' 48 Cleary also held that a breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing sounds in tort as well as contract, thereby allowing compensatory and punitive damages.
Several courts have expressly rejected a broad application of the implied covenant of good faith. In Murphy v. American Home Products
Corp., 49 the New York Court of Appeals reasoned that any implied covenant would have to be ''in aid and furtherance of other terms of the agreement of the parties.'' The court then went on to observe that the plaintiff's employment in this instance was at will, leaving the employer "an
unfettered right to terminate. " 50 The court concluded: "In the context of
such an employment it would be incongruous to say that an inference may
be drawn that the employer impliedly agreed to a provision which would
be destructive of his right of termination.' ' 51
45
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT(SEC<)ND)OF CONTRACTS§ 205 (1981); 3 A. CORBIN. CON·
TRACTS§§ 570-71 (1960).
46
3A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS§ 700 (1960).
47
Cieary v. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1980); cf. Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982).
48
Cleary, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
49
Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y. 2d 293, 304,448 N.E.2d 86,
461 N. Y.S. 2d 232 (1983). Accord: Walker v. Modem Reality of Mo., 675 F.2d 1002 (8th
Cir. 1982); Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 440N.E.2d 998 (1982);
Gordon v. Mathew Bender & Co., 562 F. Supp. 1286 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
50
Murphy, 58 N.Y. 2d at 304.
51
/d. at 304-05.
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''Negligent Performance'' of Contract Duties
In what may be something of a sport, a federal district court held in
Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc., 5 2 that an employer could be liable for the
"negligent performance" of its contract duties in discharging an employee. In this instance the performance of a previously satisfactory employee had deteriorated over time. The employer had failed to apprise the
employee adequately of his substandard work. For its carelessness in carrying out its job evaluation program, the company was held partially liable under a comparative negligence theory for the financial losses suffered by the employee upon his discharge. Chamberlain opens up some
fascinating new vistas, but so far there are no signs that other courts are
prepared to follow its lead.

CRITIQUE
In General

Legal scholars have generally approved the dismantling of employment at will. 53 For the most part, it is a matter of simple justice. Conceptually, there is nothing to be said in favor of an employer's right to treat
its employees arbitrarily or unfairly. Practicalities, naturally, are the
problem. Recognition of a wrongful discharge action will limit employer
flexibility and add to the cost of doing business. Frivolous claims will be
inevitable. Once past the egregious instances of employer arbitrariness,
some courts will flounder without guidelines in trying to define the
boundaries of public policy. Emotional juries will be carried away in
awarding massive damages. 54 Finally, it will be argued that the need for
52

Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.O. Mich. 1982).
See, e.g., Aaron, Constitutional Protections Against Unjust Dismissals from Employment: Some Reflections, in NEW TECHNIQUES IN LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 13 (H.
Anderson ed. 1976); Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing
Concept of Employment At Will, 17 AMER. Bus. L. J. 467 (1980); Blades, Employment At
Will vs. Individual Freedom: Of Limiting the Abuse of Exercise of Employer Power, 67
CoLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All Workers Are Entitled
to "Just Cause" Protection Under Title VII, 2 IND. REL L. J. 519 (1978); Peck, supra
note 12; Stieber, supra note 2; Summers, supra note 3; Symposium, Individual Rights in
the Workplace: The Employment At-Will Issue, 16 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 199 (1983).
54Single plaintiffs have been awarded four million dollars and more in compensatory
and punitive damages. For judgments on appeal, see Cancellier v. Federated Dep't
Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 131 (1983) ($1.9 million
in actual and punitive damages, plus $400,000 in attorneys' fees, for three executives);
McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835
(1981) ($300,000 actual and $1 million punitive damages awarded one managerial em53
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radical measures has not really been demonstrated; the vast majority of
employers treat their employees fairly. For these and other reasons, a
quiet counterattack has been launched by a few commentators, who
would confine if not roll back the recent revolution in unjust dismissal
law. 55
On balance I think the equities tilt toward the individual employee.
Recognizing a wrongful discharge action will impose some additional
burdens on business; failing to recognize it will perpetuate the devastation
visited annually on about 100,000 workers who are fired without just
cause. 56 American business would not be placed at a competitive disadvantage in the international markets. Protection against unfair discharge
is now provided by statute in about sixty countries around the world, including all of the Common Market, Sweden and Norway, Japan, Canada,
and others in South America, Africa, and Asia. 57 The International Labor
Organization recommended in 1963 and again in 1982 that workers not
be terminated except for a valid reason. 5 8 The United States remains the
last major industrial democracy that has not heeded the call for unjust dismisallegislation.
In my view the question for the future is not whether the modification
of at-will doctrine will continue, but whether the task will be completed
by the courts or the legislatures. In the past there were two schools of
thought: statutes are necessary to protect employee rights because the judiciary is too encrusted by adverse precedent; 59 contrarily, the courts
must act because legislation is so much the product of organized interest
groups, and the individual worker is by definition unorganized. 60 With
the benefit of several years' hindsight, one can say that it is not at all impossible a solution will be fashioned by the judiciary. But the courts are
likely to be long on generalization and short on detail when it comes to
spelling out procedures, remedies, and so on. At the same time, even

ployee). A defendants' law firm in San Francisco studied California discharge cases that
went to juries in 1982 and found that 90 percent resulted in plaintiffs' verdicts, with the
average award being $450,000. Palefsky, Wrongful Termination Litigation: "Dagwood"
and Goliath, 62 MICH. B. J. 776 (1983).
55
See Power, A Defense of the Employment At Will Rule, 27 ST. LOUIS U. L. REV.
881 (1983); Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate At Will-Have the Courts Forgotten
the E';l,loyer? 35 V AND L. REV. 201 (1982).
See text accompanying note 2, supra.
57
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 11, at 175.
58
/d. at 179-80; 1982 Convention Concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, PROVISIONAL
RECORD OF SIXTY-EIGHTH SESSION No. 30A (June 21, 1982).
59
Summers, supra note 3, at 521.
60
Peck, supra note 12, at 3.
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though the legislatures may not wish to take the initiative for a whole fistful of understandable political reasons, they may be goaded into action by
the boldness of certain courts. Furthermore, it is entirely conceivable that
at some point employers themselves might support legislation on the
ground the compromises and greater exactness of a statutory solution are
preferable to the broad strokes and blurred outlines often produced by an
innovative judiciary - not to mention the crushing damages awarded by
some outraged juries. 61 The upshot may be that in a number of states the
process will go through two stages. The first few steps, halting, tentative,
or even blundering, will be taken by the courts, and then the legislatures
will be almost compelled to move in and provide a more definitive
blueprint.
A critical factor in securing legislative relief may be the attitude of
organized labor. It is about the only interest group one can identify that
might be willing to take the lead in promoting such a cause. A common
assumption, however, is that unions will not favor legislation protecting
employees against arbitrary treatment by employers because it will eliminate or detract from one of the unions' prime selling points in their efforts
to organize the unorganized. I cannot deny this possibility, but I think it
would be as shortsighted as was organized labor's initial hostility toward
the Fair Labor Standards Act. 62 First, and not insignificantly, organized
labor could profit considerably from refurbishing its image as the champion of the disadvantaged. Second, and perhaps more practically, a universal rule against dismissal without cause should actually prove beneficial to unions in their organizing drives. Now, when a union sympathizer
is fired in the middle of a campaign, it must be established by a preponderance of the evidence that a motivating factor in the discharge was the
exercise of rights protected by the Labor Act. 63 This is frequently a burden too heavy to bear. With a just cause requirement generally applicable, it would be up to the employer to show that some positive, acceptable basis existed for the discharge. Finally, I belive there is a strong
likelihood that just cause standards will act more as a spur than a hindrance to union organizing. The promise of fair treatment will be held out
to employees; the promise may remain a tantalizing and unrealized
dream, however, unless there is present the means to actualize it. Constant, effective representation and advocacy is the surest way to ensure
61

See supra note 54 and accompanying text.

62F. DULLES. LABOR IN AMERICA

283-85 (1960).
Elec. Mfg. v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1959); NLRB v. West Point
Mfg., 245 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1957); cf. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 103
S.Ct. 2469 (1983).
63Miller
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any right. That is a lesson public sector unions have already learned in
representing employees in civil service proceedings.
In addition to the possible reservations of organized labor, some neutrals in industrial relations might oppose a statutory just cause requirement for fear that it would erode such worthy values as voluntarism, private initiative, and workplace creativity, and more particularly the
collective bargaining process itself. I, too, treasure the unique American
institution of union-employer bargaining, but when even so hardheaded
an observer as John Dunlop can be found rhapsodizing on its ''beauty,' ' 64
I think we should all be wary about being carried away by the mystique of
the process. Collective bargaining, after all, is a means and not an end.
The objective is the betterment of the individual working person. When
only about a quarter of the labor force is currently afforded protection
against unjust discipline, I feel the needs of the other three-quarters outweigh some theoretical risk to traditional bargaining processes. Even
then, assuming history is any guide, we underrate the flexibility and resilience of collective bargaining if we believe it cannot adapt to, and indeed
exploit, a new legal environment.
Statutory Proposals

Elsewhere I have set forth at some length my thoughts on the details
of a statutory procedure for protecting employees against unjust discharge. 65 Briefly, I would recommend a "just cause" requirement for a
dismissal in any establishment having more than ten or fifteen employees. Probationary employees with less than six months' service, and
higher ranking, policy-making management personnel, would not be protected. Ideally, I think all discipline should be covered, but perhaps an
appropriate compromise, at least at the outset, would be to cover only dis64

Dunlop, The Social Utility of Collective Bargaining, in CHALLENGES TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 168-73 (L. Ulman ed. 1867).
65
St. Antoine, Protection Against Unjust Discipline: An Idea Whose Time Has Long
Since Come, in ARBITRATION ISSUES FOR THE 1980s, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTYFOURTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 43, 52-61 (J. Stern &
B. Dennis eds. 1982). For other views, see Summers, supra note 3; Howlett, Due Process
for Nonunionized Employees: A Practical Proposal, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH
ASS'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING 164 (B. Dennis ed.
1980); STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW SECTION, To STRIKE A
NEW BALANCE: REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON TERMINATION AT WILL AND
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE (1984). In recent years "just cause" bills have been introduced in
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and the U.S. Congress, See, e.g., Ann Arbor [Mich.] News, June
10, 1984, at C5, col. I.
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charges and "constructive discharges," i.e., resignations or quits resulting from improper employer conduct.
To avoid the expense, length, and formality of court proceedings, I
would create a panel of arbitrators as adjudicators. Arbitration should
probably be preceded by mediation and a "reasonable cause" determination to sift out frivolous claims. Adopting the arbitration format would
immediately make available the vast body of arbitral precedent concerning substance and procedure that has been developed in countless decisions since the Second World War. It would also permit the use of an established nucleus of experienced arbitrators, and of the growing number
of young, able aspirants who are caught in the vicious circle of being denied experience because they have no experience. The arbitrator's cost
would be borne equally by the parties, although the arbitrator might have
the discretion to charge the full amount to the employer in the less defensible cases.
As remedies I would authorize the arbitrator to award backpay, reinstatement, or severance pay, as the circumstances warrant. This of course
would be a trade-off that I hope might make unjust dismissal legislation
more palatable to the business community. It would immediately eliminate the possibility of the catastrophic compensatory tort or punitive damage award that has already been the lot of many a hapless employer. 66

CONCLUSION

Protection against unjust discharge is fast acquiring the force of a
moral and historical imperative. The common law of contract, tort, or
even property needs only a small adjustment to accommodate this new
concept. More to the point, statutory relief for this long-neglected abuse
of the unorganized worker should now become part of the immediate
agenda of conscientious legislators and of all those who labor in the field
of industrial relations.
The prevention of arbitrary treatment of employees may not only be
the humane approach; there is evidence it is also good business. 67 In aperiod when intense attention is lavished on the Japanese way of management, on the almost paternal relationship between Japanese employers
and their employees, and the lifelong careers guaranteed many workers in
66

See, supra note 54 and accompanying text.
e.g., Foulkes, Large Nonunionized Employers, in U.S. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 1950-1980: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 129, 134-36, 141-44, 155-56 (J. Stieber, R.
McKersie & D. Mills eds. 1980).
67See,
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Japanese companies, we should be prepared to entertain the proposition
that there may be a marked correlation between a secure work force and
high productivity and quality output. 68 Justice, like honesty, can be the
best policy.

68 See, e.g., E. VOGEL, JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE: LESSONS FOR AMERICA 131-57
(1979); cf. SPECIAL TASK FORCE, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, WORK IN
AMERICA 93-110, 188-201 (1972).

